PUBLIC_RELEASE_CHECKLIST.md

1# Public Release Checklist
2
3*SophaxChat — what needs to happen before a public v1.0 release.*
4
5---
6
7## 🔴 Blockers (must fix before public release)
8
9### Security
10
11- [x] **H-1: Group re-keying on member leave** ✅
12  Fixed: `leaveGroup()` broadcasts `groupMemberLeft` before deleting local key material. Remaining members rotate to a fresh random sender chain and redistribute it via their individual DR channels. Departed member loses forward access.
13
14- [x] **Notification content hiding (M-4)** ✅
15  Fixed: `UNNotificationCategory("SOPHAX_MSG")` registered in `requestNotificationPermission()` with `hiddenPreviewsBodyPlaceholder = "New message"`. iOS hides body when user sets Show Previews to "When Unlocked" or "Never".
16
17- [x] **Key rotation UI / warning on key change** ✅
18  Fixed: TOFU detection in `didDiscoverPeer` — if a peer's `signingKeyPublic` changes and they were never verified, the old safety number is injected into `verifiedPeers` so `hasKeyChanged()` fires the "Safety Number changed" red banner on next open.
19
20### Stability
21
22- [x] **Error handling in ChatManager send paths** ✅
23  Fixed: `sendGroupMessage` / `sendGroupAttachment` now store the message as `.sending` first, surface any encryption failure via `didEncounterError` (shown as a red `!` bubble + alert), and mark the stored message `.failed` so the UI reflects the real state.
24
25- [x] **Session state corruption recovery** ✅
26  Fixed: `withSession()` catches `importState` failure, deletes the corrupt Keychain blob, and throws `sessionStateCorrupted`. Outbound callers (`sendMessage`, `sendAttachment`) catch this, mark the message `.failed`, and call `broadcastHello()` so the peer re-initiates X3DH. Inbound path also calls `broadcastHello()` on corruption so the peer re-initiates automatically.
27
28- [x] **Group skipped message key cache (M-1)** ✅
29  Fixed: `skippedGroupMessageKeys[groupID/senderPeerID][iteration]` bounded cache (200 keys/sender). Out-of-order messages hit the cache first; keys consumed on use (no replay). Evicted automatically when capacity is exceeded.
30
31### App Store / Distribution
32
33- [x] **Privacy manifest (`PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy`)** ✅
34  Added: `NSPrivacyTracking=false`, no tracking domains, no collected data types, UserDefaults access declared with reason `CA92.1` (read/write by same app only).
35
36- [ ] **App Store metadata**
37  App name, subtitle, description, keywords, screenshots (iPhone 6.7", iPad 12.9"), support URL, privacy policy URL. None of these exist yet.
38
39- [ ] **Privacy policy**
40  Required by Apple and GDPR. Minimum content: what data is collected (answer: none stored on servers — none exist), how identity keys are generated, what "disappearing messages" means, contact for data requests. Must be hosted at a public URL.
41
42- [ ] **TestFlight beta program**
43  Run a closed beta before public release. Gather crash reports, test edge cases in real-world mesh environments (noisy BLE, mixed iOS/macOS peers).
44
45---
46
47## 🟡 Important (should fix for v1.0)
48
49### Security
50
51- [x] **Safety Number pinning persistence** ✅
52  Fixed: verified state is stored in the Keychain (`saveVerifiedPeers`) and survives relaunch.
53
54- [ ] **Sender Key Distribution delivery confirmation (M-2)**
55  In high-traffic scenarios, a new group member's first messages may arrive before their SKD is received by peers. Implement a hold-and-retry or buffering mechanism, or include the chain state in a resent SKD.
56
57- [ ] **One-time prekey exhaustion UI (M-3)**
58  If Bob's OTPK pool is empty, X3DH proceeds without DH4, reducing entropy. The UI should warn Alice that the session was established without a one-time prekey.
59
60- [ ] **Message ordering in groups (L-2)**
61  Group message timestamps are sender-controlled. A malicious or clock-skewed sender can reorder the conversation UI. Consider using a locally-received-at timestamp for display ordering, with the sender timestamp shown as metadata.
62
63### UX / Completeness
64
65- [x] **Offline store-and-forward** ✅
66  Fixed: When a relay peer is the only path to the target, the sealed message is also broadcast as a `StoreAndForwardRequest`. Relay peers cache up to 300 items with a 48-hour TTL and deliver them in a batch (`StoreAndForwardDelivery`) when the target peer next connects (triggered from `handleHello`).
67
68- [x] **Group reply and reactions** ✅
69  Fixed: group conversations support reply-to and emoji reactions (`sendGroupReaction`, `replyToID`).
70
71- [ ] **Message delivery status in groups**
72  There is no "delivered to all members" or "read by N members" indication in group conversations.
73
74- [ ] **Peer reconnect notification**
75  No indication when a previously offline peer comes back online (relevant for draining the offline queue).
76
77- [x] **Username change** ✅
78  Fixed: rename from Identity settings; the new name is re-broadcast via Hello.
79
80- [ ] **Localization**
81  The app ships English only. At minimum, support the most common languages in the target user base (activists, journalists in non-English regions).
82
83### Code Quality
84
85- [x] **L-3: `ISO8601DateFormatter` allocation per `signingBytes()` call** ✅
86  Fixed: `WireMessage` uses a single cached static `ISO8601DateFormatter`.
87
88- [ ] **Swift 6 strict concurrency warnings**
89  Audit all `@unchecked Sendable` conformances (`ChatManager`, `DoubleRatchet`). Document or enforce the caller-must-serialize contract.
90
91- [ ] **Unit test coverage for group Sender Keys**
92  No automated tests for `senderKeyRatchetStep`, `handleGroupMessage` v2 path, or `handleSenderKeyDistribution`. Add tests before the group messaging code ossifies.
93
94- [ ] **Unit tests for sealed sender and header encryption**
95  The DR+HE and sealed sender wrappers lack automated tests for round-trip correctness and AAD binding.
96
97---
98
99## 🟢 Nice to have (post v1.0)
100
101- [x] **Background operation** ✅ — `bluetooth-central`/`bluetooth-peripheral` modes + `BGAppRefreshTask` for periodic mesh restart. MPC stays alive minutes after backgrounding; BGTask extends coverage after full suspension.
102- [x] **Channel discovery** ✅ — `ChannelAnnouncement` wire type; creators broadcast signed announcements; non-members see "Nearby Channels" in the list.
103- [x] **Pluggable transport adapter** ✅ — `MessageTransport` protocol defined; `MeshManager` is the reference implementation; LoRa/audio stubs documented.
104- [ ] **Independent third-party security audit** — highest-priority external item
105- [x] **MLS (Messaging Layer Security)** ✅ — default for new groups on iPhone/iPad/Mac when all members have exchanged MLS keys; Sender Keys remain the fallback and the only option on Android
106- [ ] **Hardware security key binding** — FIDO2 / Secure Enclave for identity key protection (SE migration path needed)
107- [ ] **iPad-optimized layout** — sidebar + detail view on larger screens
108- [ ] **App Clip / Share Extension** — quick-reply without opening the full app
109
110---
111
112## Summary
113
114| Category | Total | Done | Remaining |
115|---|---|---|---|
116| 🔴 Blockers | 10 | 7 | 3 (App Store metadata, privacy policy, TestFlight) |
117| 🟡 Important | 14 | 5 | 9 |
118| 🟢 Nice to have | 8 | 4 | 4 |
119
120**Remaining blockers before App Store submission**: App Store metadata (screenshots, description, keywords), privacy policy hosted at a public URL, and TestFlight beta run. No further code blockers.